El cálculo de la toma de decisiones corruptas: un marco analítico integrado
| dc.contributor.author | Batista Vieira, James | |
| dc.contributor.orcid | Batista Vieira, James [0000-0002-3564-3677] | spa |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-03-16T15:28:08Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-03-16T15:28:08Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-11-26 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Este artículo desarrolla un modelo integrado para la toma de decisiones sobre la participación en transacciones corruptas. Las explicaciones utilitarias, institucionales y psicosociales-culturales existentes suelen operar en aislamiento analítico y generar una brecha persistente en su integración, por lo que este modelo llena esa brecha al reunir estas perspectivas en una especificación probabilística. Con base en aportes centrales de la literatura, el involucramiento en actos corruptos se modela como el resultado probabilístico de superar una barrera moral y de realizar un cálculo coste-beneficio moldeado por el aprendizaje. Al aclarar las decisiones de los agentes públicos y ofrecer a los formuladores de políticas herramientas prácticas para diseñar políticas de integridad que aborden de manera conjunta los factores éticos, institucionales y conductuales, el modelo proporciona una perspectiva más realista y relevante para las políticas públicas que los enfoques centrados únicamente en incentivos utilitarios o en sanciones legales. | spa |
| dc.description.abstractenglish | This article develops an integrated decision-making model of engagement in corrupt transactions. Existing utilitarian, institutional, and psychosocial-cultural accounts typically operate in analytic isolation, producing a persistent gap in their integration; this model fills that gap by bringing these perspectives together within a probabilistic specification. Drawing on core contributions from the literature, corrupt engagement is modeled as the probabilistic outcome of crossing a moral hurdle and performing a learning-shaped cost-benefit calculus. By clarifying public agents’ choices and providing policymakers with actionable tools to design integrity policies that jointly address ethical, institutional, and behavioral drivers, the model offers a more realistic and policy-relevant perspective than approaches focused solely on utilitarian incentives or legal sanctions. | eng |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.29375/01240781.5503 | |
| dc.identifier.instname | instname:Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNAB | spa |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0124-0781 | spa |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2590-8669 | spa |
| dc.identifier.repourl | repourl:https://repository.unab.edu.co | spa |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12749/33501 | |
| dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
| dc.publisher | Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga UNAB | spa |
| dc.relation | https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/article/view/5503/4294 | spa |
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| dc.relation.uri | https://revistas.unab.edu.co/index.php/reflexion/issue/view/331 | spa |
| dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
| dc.source | Vol. 27 Núm. 56 (2025): Corrupción y anticorrupción en América Latina: retos, innovaciones y perspectivas; 31-44 | spa |
| dc.subject | Corrupción | spa |
| dc.subject | Toma de decisiones | spa |
| dc.subject | Política gubernamental | spa |
| dc.subject | Administración pública | spa |
| dc.subject | Gobernanza | spa |
| dc.subject.keywords | Corruption | eng |
| dc.subject.keywords | Decision making | eng |
| dc.subject.keywords | Government policy | eng |
| dc.subject.keywords | Public administration | eng |
| dc.subject.keywords | Governance | spa |
| dc.title | El cálculo de la toma de decisiones corruptas: un marco analítico integrado | spa |
| dc.title.translated | The Calculus of Corrupt Decision-Making: An Integrated Analytical Framework | eng |
| dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 | |
| dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | spa |
| dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type.hasversion | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
| dc.type.local | Artículo | spa |
| dc.type.redcol | http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART |
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